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AWS Security Testing Guide

2026-11-12 AWS Security Hub CSPM · CIS AWS Foundations v5.0.0 · MITRE ATT&CK IaaS
awscloudmethodologyconfiguration-reviewassumed-breach

This is the hub of our AWS security series. The series is written for people who test AWS accounts for a living: configuration reviews, assumed-breach assessments and the cloud half of a wider pentest. It is equally useful to the cloud and DevOps teams who want to run the same checks themselves before someone else does. There are 19 notes. Eighteen cover one area each and follow the same shape: how the service’s security model works, what goes wrong, numbered tests with commands (203 in total, GT-AWS-<AREA>-n), hardening with policy and IaC snippets, public real-world cases, a rating table and a mapping to AWS Security Hub CSPM, the CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark and MITRE ATT&CK. The nineteenth is a reading list of public AWS incidents and research. This page explains how the pieces fit together and how we run an assessment end to end.

Contents

Rules of engagement

Everything in this series assumes an authorised engagement against accounts the client owns, with a written scope that names the account IDs, Regions and any production restrictions. Three rules come from AWS itself, and they are worth reading in full on the AWS penetration testing policy page before every engagement because it changes:

  • What you may test without asking AWS. The policy lists “permitted services” (at the time of writing EC2, RDS, Aurora, CloudFront, API Gateway, AppSync, Lambda, Lightsail, Elastic Beanstalk, ECS, Fargate, OpenSearch, FSx, Transit Gateway, Global Accelerator and a few more). Testing your client’s configuration through read-only API calls is a different thing from attacking the service, but anything that sends attack traffic at a resource should target a permitted service.
  • What is prohibited outright. DNS zone walking, hijacking or pharming via Route 53; DoS, DDoS and simulated versions of them outside AWS’s separate DDoS-simulation policy; port, protocol and request flooding; S3 bucket takeover and subdomain takeover. That last pair matters for this series: when you find a dangling bucket or CNAME you report it, and the client re-creates the resource in their own account as the fix. You never claim it yourself, even with the client’s blessing.
  • You test the customer, not AWS. If you find a flaw in an AWS service itself, stop and report it to AWS Security. Covert red-team exercises and hosting command and control need AWS’s Simulated Events approval.

On top of AWS’s rules, the series follows ours: read-only by default; anything that changes state is marked lab or explicitly approved only and uses a benign proof (sts get-caller-identity after assuming a role, a marker object in an approved bucket); no reading of secret values, log contents or customer data unless the client has agreed to it in writing; and no techniques for evading CloudTrail, GuardDuty or CloudWatch. The logging notes ask the opposite question: is tampering blocked and does somebody get paged?

If you find a credential during the test (in code, user data, logs, an image layer), stop at identification. aws sts get-access-key-info tells you which account the key belongs to without touching that account; anything more, including get-caller-identity with the key, needs written approval. Then the client rotates it.

Access for the assessment

Ask for a role, not a user. The cleanest set-up is an IAM Identity Center permission set, or a cross-account role in each in-scope account that trusts a tester account, with:

Need Typical grant Notes
Configuration review AWS managed SecurityAudit + ViewOnlyAccess Covers most List*/Describe*/Get*Policy calls. It deliberately does not read secret values, S3 objects or CloudWatch Logs content.
Effective-permission checks iam:SimulatePrincipalPolicy, iam:SimulateCustomPolicy Not always in SecurityAudit; ask for it explicitly. Needed by the privilege-escalation and STS notes.
Organisation view Read-only role in the management account or the delegated admin for Organizations organizations:List*/Describe* for SCPs, RCPs and the account tree.
Log content and secret scans Separate, time-boxed grant (e.g. logs:StartQuery on named log groups) Only with written approval; results redacted. See the CloudWatch note.
Assumed-breach paths A low-privileged role the client chooses as the “foothold” State-changing proofs only where approved, in agreed accounts.

Use short sessions with MFA, keep the tester’s actions identifiable (a dedicated role name and a source identity or session name that says who you are), and give the client your egress IPs so their SOC can tell your activity apart. Do not ask them to add your IPs to GuardDuty trusted lists or suppression rules; you want to know what their detection sees.

A Region loop you will use in nearly every note:

for r in $(aws ec2 describe-regions --all-regions \
            --query 'Regions[?OptInStatus!=`not-opted-in`].RegionName' --output text); do
  echo "== $r"
  aws ec2 describe-instances --region "$r" --query 'length(Reservations[].Instances[])'
done

Methodology

We run AWS assessments in eight phases. They overlap in practice, but the order matters: the inventory and identity work in phases 1–4 tells you where the service reviews should go deep.

Phase Goal Notes to use
1. Scope and inventory Confirm account IDs, Regions in use, organisation layout, which accounts hold production data Organizations, IAM fundamentals
2. Outside-in view What an anonymous attacker sees: hostnames, buckets, public snapshots, leaked keys, dangling DNS Unauthenticated recon, Cognito
3. Automated baseline Prowler / ScoutSuite run plus the client’s own Security Hub CSPM results, triaged rather than pasted Detection and posture services
4. Identity review Root hygiene, MFA, keys, over-broad policies, trust relationships, escalation graph IAM fundamentals, Privilege escalation, STS and trust
5. Service reviews Go deep where the data and the internet exposure are Data: S3, data stores, secrets and KMS. Compute: EC2, Lambda, containers. Edge: network, edge and DNS, API Gateway, SNS, SQS
6. Assumed-breach paths From the agreed foothold, which paths lead to admin, data or other accounts, proven benignly where approved Privilege escalation, STS, CI/CD and IaC
7. Logging and detection Is everything recorded, protected from tampering, and does an alert reach a human? CloudTrail, CloudWatch and EventBridge, Detection and posture services
8. Reporting Findings with evidence, attack paths drawn end to end, fixes as policy/IaC Rating table below; each note’s “Rating findings” section

Two habits make the difference between a scanner report and an assessment. First, chain findings: an IMDSv1 instance is Medium on its own and Critical when its role can pass an admin role to Lambda. Draw the path. Second, check the controls that would have caught you: for every path, note whether CloudTrail recorded it, whether GuardDuty raised anything and whether that finding reached a person.

Series map

Area Note Tests What it covers
Outside-in AWS Unauthenticated Reconnaissance and Exposure Discovery 10 AWS fingerprints in DNS/HTTP/TLS, account IDs, client bucket names, public snapshots/AMIs/SSM documents, leaked keys, dangling DNS
Identity AWS IAM Fundamentals and Policy Evaluation 11 Principals, credentials, the full evaluation logic, root, MFA, keys, over-broad statements, iam:PassRole
Identity AWS IAM Privilege Escalation Paths 12 The published escalation families (42 paths), finding who holds them, benign lab proofs, fixes, detection
Identity AWS STS, Cross-Account Trust and Federation 11 Trust policies, ExternalId, confused deputy, GitHub OIDC, IRSA, SAML, session tags, revocation
Identity Amazon Cognito Security 12 Self-sign-up, writable attributes, account takeover, token validation, guest credentials, role mapping
Data Amazon S3 Security 12 Block Public Access, ACLs, policies, SSE-C abuse, squatted and dangling buckets, logging
Data AWS Data Stores: RDS, Aurora, DynamoDB and Snapshots 12 Exposure, shared snapshots, auth and TLS, IAM paths to data; ElastiCache, OpenSearch, Redshift
Data AWS Secrets Manager, Parameter Store and KMS 10 Who can read secrets and keys, key policies, grants, rotation, destructive key actions
Compute Amazon EC2 Security: IMDS, EBS, AMIs and Systems Manager 10 IMDSv1/v2, instance roles, user data, snapshots and AMIs, SSM as a remote shell
Compute AWS Lambda and Serverless Security 12 Resource policies, function URLs, env-var secrets, code and layers, event injection, runtimes
Compute AWS Container Security: ECS, EKS and ECR 12 Registry exposure, secrets in images, task and pod credentials, EKS access, IRSA and Pod Identity
Network and edge AWS Network, Edge and DNS Security 12 Security groups, endpoints and policies, load balancers, CloudFront, WAF, Route 53, flow logs
Integration Amazon API Gateway, SNS and SQS Security 12 Authorisers and their caching, private APIs, default endpoints, topic, queue and event-bus policies
Logging AWS CloudTrail: Audit Logging Done Right 11 Organisation trails, data and network events, validation, bucket and KMS hardening, tamper alerts, Athena
Monitoring Amazon CloudWatch and EventBridge 12 CIS metric filters and alarms, EventBridge rules, Logs Insights; secrets in logs, log sharing, public dashboards
Detection AWS Detection and Posture Services 11 GuardDuty, Security Hub CSPM, Config, Inspector, Macie, Detective, Access Analyzer, flow and DNS logs
Governance AWS Organizations and Multi-Account Security 10 Management account, SCPs, RCPs, declarative policies, delegated admins, root access, Identity Center
Delivery AWS CI/CD and Infrastructure-as-Code Security 11 OIDC trust, CI role privilege, CodeBuild webhooks, CloudFormation and CDK roles, Terraform state
Reading list AWS Security Incidents and Research Writeups — Thirty public breaches and research disclosures, each with its lesson and the note that tests for it

The test IDs are stable: GT-AWS-S3-6 will always mean the same check, so you can cite them in reports and track them between engagements.

Where to start: twenty high-value checks

If you have a day rather than two weeks, these checks find most of the serious issues we see. Each links to the note with the full test.

  1. Root user: no access keys, MFA on, centralised root access where Organizations is used. IAM fundamentals
  2. Long-lived access keys older than 90 days or unused, especially on CI users. IAM fundamentals
  3. Escalation graph: which non-admin principals can reach admin (PMapper, simulate-principal-policy). Privilege escalation
  4. Trust policies with "AWS": "*", a whole foreign account, or third-party roles without sts:ExternalId. STS
  5. GitHub Actions OIDC roles without a tight token.actions.githubusercontent.com:sub condition. CI/CD
  6. Public S3: account-level Block Public Access off, policies or ACLs granting *, website buckets. S3
  7. Public or cross-account snapshots and AMIs (EBS, RDS, Redshift). EC2, data stores
  8. IMDSv1 still allowed on instances whose role matters. EC2
  9. Secrets outside the vault: user data, Lambda environment variables, ECS task definitions, CloudFormation parameters, log groups. Secrets and KMS
  10. Security groups open to 0.0.0.0/0 or ::/0 on SSH, RDP and database ports. Network
  11. Dangling DNS in the client’s hosted zones. Network
  12. Lambda function URLs with AuthType NONE and functions with public resource policies. Lambda
  13. API Gateway routes with no authorisation and authoriser caching keyed on the wrong identity source. API Gateway
  14. Cognito identity pools with guest access, and what the unauthenticated role can do. Cognito
  15. EKS public endpoints, aws-auth/access-entry admin sprawl, pods that can reach the node role. Containers
  16. KMS key policies with * principals or broad cross-account grants; keys pending deletion. Secrets and KMS
  17. CloudTrail: one organisation trail, all Regions, validation on, bucket in a log-archive account, StopLogging/DeleteTrail denied by SCP and alerted. CloudTrail
  18. Alert routing: GuardDuty and Security Hub findings reach a human through EventBridge and a confirmed SNS subscription. CloudWatch and EventBridge
  19. GuardDuty coverage: every account and Region, protection plans on, no over-broad suppression rules. Detection services
  20. Management account: no workloads, few humans, and a tight trust on OrganizationAccountAccessRole. Organizations

Tooling

All of these run read-only with the audit role above, except where a note says otherwise.

Tool What we use it for Main notes
AWS CLI v2 + jq Every check in the series; examples use real commands and --query All
Prowler Broad baseline; each note lists the relevant check names All
ScoutSuite Second baseline and an offline HTML report for the evidence pack All
CloudFox Attack-surface views: role trusts, secrets locations, endpoints, environment variables Recon, STS, compute notes
PMapper IAM graph and escalation queries Privilege escalation, STS
Pacu Enumeration modules and iam__privesc_scan --scan-only; offensive modules lab only Privilege escalation, Cognito
cloudsplaining Policy risk report (privilege escalation, data exfiltration, resource exposure) IAM fundamentals, privilege escalation
IAM Access Analyzer External, internal and unused access findings; policy validation IAM, S3, STS, detection
trufflehog / gitleaks Secrets in code, images and exports, run without key verification unless approved Recon, containers, CI/CD
kube-bench, kubectl EKS node and cluster checks Containers
Checkov, Trivy, KICS, cfn-nag IaC scanning of the client’s repositories CI/CD
Stratus Red Team Detection validation in a lab or approved sandbox account only Detection, CloudTrail, CloudWatch

Treat scanner output as leads, not findings. Every note explains the common false positives for its area (a “public” bucket that serves a public website by design, a wildcard principal constrained by aws:PrincipalOrgID, a role that looks admin but is fenced by a permission boundary and an SCP).

Rating findings

The series uses one rating model so that findings from different notes sit in the same report without arguing with each other. Rate by what an attacker gains (data read or write, code execution, account or organisation takeover), the precondition (anonymous internet, any authenticated principal, a specific role, an insider), the blast radius (one resource, one account, the organisation) and whether the activity would be detected.

Typical finding Severity Why
Anonymous read of sensitive data (public bucket, snapshot, unauthenticated API) or anonymous path to admin Critical No precondition, direct data or control impact
Low-privileged role can escalate to account admin High–Critical Every compromised workload or user becomes a full compromise; Critical when the foothold is internet-facing
Cross-account trust open to any account, or OIDC trust open to any repository Critical Anyone on the internet who can mint a token or holds an AWS account walks in
Secret in user data, environment variables or logs readable by broad roles High Turns read-only access into credentials; severity follows what the secret unlocks
IMDSv1 on an instance with a powerful role and an SSRF-prone application High One web bug away from credential theft; Medium without a meaningful role
CloudTrail missing, not organisation-wide, or tamperable without an alert Medium–High High when it covers the management or log-archive account; you cannot investigate what you did not record
Findings that never reach a human (no routing, unconfirmed SNS) Medium Detection exists on paper only
Hygiene gaps without a demonstrated path (old keys unused, missing tags, default encryption choices) Low–Info Fix, but do not let them crowd the report

Each note refines this for its own finding types. When findings chain, rate the chain and reference the parts.

Framework mapping

Every test carries three kinds of reference, and each note ends with a mapping table.

  • AWS Security Hub CSPM controls (for example S3.1, IAM.6, CloudTrail.2). AWS renamed the original Security Hub product to Security Hub CSPM in 2025 when it launched a new, unified Security Hub; the control IDs did not change. Where no control exists for a test (trust-policy conditions, KMS grants, webhook filters and many more), the mapping says “none”. That gap is the point of a manual review.
  • CIS AWS Foundations Benchmark, cited with the version (mostly v5.0.0 and v3.0.0, with v1.4.0 where Security Hub still evaluates older monitoring controls). CIS covers identity, storage, logging, monitoring and networking basics; it says nothing about most services in this series.
  • MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise techniques for the IaaS platform. ATT&CK v20 (2026) re-numbered the defence-impairment area: what used to be T1562.008 Disable or Modify Cloud Logs is now T1685.002, and cloud firewall changes moved from T1562.007 to T1686.001. The notes use the new IDs and mention the old ones.

Prowler check names are listed under “Automated coverage” in each test, taken from the Prowler repository at the time of writing.

Practice labs

Practise anything state-changing in an account you own, never on a client’s.

  • flaws.cloud and flaws2.cloud: Scott Piper’s classic walk-throughs of S3, snapshot, IMDS and logging mistakes (flaws2 has an attacker and a defender path).
  • CloudGoat: Rhino Security Labs’ scenarios for privilege escalation, Lambda, ECS, Cognito and more, deployed into your own account.
  • IAM Vulnerable: Bishop Fox’s Terraform for 31 IAM escalation paths, ideal for testing PMapper, Pacu and your own queries.
  • Stratus Red Team: runs single ATT&CK techniques against a sandbox account so you can check that CloudTrail, GuardDuty and your alert routing actually fire.

Related on this site: the Cognito note and the mobile note on secrets hardcoded in app packages meet in the middle, because mobile apps are where identity pool IDs and stray AWS keys most often turn up. Public mobile writeups are collected on the Bug Bounty Writeups page.

References

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